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IMPOSING DUTIES ON WITNESSES TO CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE: A FUTILE RESPONSE TO
BYSTANDER INDIFFERENCE
Jessica R. Givelber
INTRODUCTION
It is important to bear in mind, in actions for injuries to children,
a very simple and fundamental fact, which in this class of cases is
sometimes strangely lost sight of, viz. that no action arises without a
breach of duty .... I see my neighbor's two year old babe in [a]
dangerous [situation] ... and easily might, but do not, rescue him. I
am not liable in damages to the child for his injuries, nor, if the child
is killed, punishable for manslaughter... because the child and I are
strangers.
-Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co.'
How much am I supposed to-to sit down and cry about this? I
mean, how-I mean, let's be reasonable here. Is my life supposed
to halt for-like, for days, weeks and months on end? ... The sim-
ple fact remains, I do not know this little girl.
-David Cash, Jr.2
Particularly loathsome crimes often inspire legislation that attempts
to either change behavior or express a community's moral outrage.3
In May 1997, high school senior Jeremy Strohmeyer raped and stran-
1. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810-11 (N.H. 1898) (citation omitted); see
also id. at 810 ("In dealing with cases which involve injuries to children, courts have
sometimes strangely confounded legal obligation with sentiments that are independ-
ent of law." (citation omitted)). Scholars who write about the "no duty to rescue"
rule frequently cite Buci for the proposition that "[v]ith purely moral obligations the
law does not deal." Id.; see, e.g., David C. Biggs, "The Good Samaritan is Packing":"
An Overview of the Broadened Duty to Aid Your Fellowiman, with the Modern Desire
to Possess Concealed Weapons, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 225, 228 n.10 (1997) ("[Tlhe
priest and Levite who passed by on the other side were not, it is supposed, liable at
law for the continued suffering of the man who fell among thieves, which they might,
and morally ought to have, prevented or relieved." (quoting Buch, 44 A. at 810));
Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 Vand. L Rev. 673, 679 n.21
(1994) (citing Buch for the proposition that the law cannot appropriately enforce
moral obligations); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale I.-. 247,
247 (1980) (citing Bud in explaining why courts refuse to impose a general duty to
rescue).
2. 60 Minutes: The Bad Samaritan? David Cash Faces Hostility From Public for
Not Taking Action to Prevent the Rape and Murder of Sherrice Iverson by His Friend
Jeremy Strohmeyer (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 27, 1998) [hereinafter 60 Minutes]
(quoting David Cash, Jr.'s response to questions about the brutal attack of a seven-
year-old child whom he chose not to "rescue").
3. See, e.g., Biggs, supra note 1, at 232 (suggesting that terrible human events that
result in the death of "vulnerable victim[s]" often ins pire legislation); Talk of the Na-
tion (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 1, 1998) (interview with law professor
Peter Aranella) (discussing the sexual assault and murder of Sherrice Iverson). For a
discussion of state legislation responding to popular moral outrage, see infra Part Ill.
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gled seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson in a restroom at the Primadonna
Resort and Casino in Primm, Nevada.4 Strohmeyer's best friend,
David Cash, Jr., observed Strohmeyer's initial assault of the child, but
did not attempt to intervene.5 Instead, he exited the restroom after
two minutes and waited for his friend in the casino. 6 Cash failed to
notify either the police or any casino employee of Strohmeyer's ac-
tions.7 Twenty-four minutes later, Strohmeyer emerged from the rest-
room.8 He told Cash that he had sexually assaulted and killed
Sherrice.9 The two boys gambled for a while longer and drove
home.' ° Later, Strohmeyer was arrested and prosecuted for his vi-
cious attack." To avoid a potential death sentence, Strohmeyer plead
guilty to kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder.' 2 A Las Vegas judge
then sentenced him to life in prison without parole.' 3
Despite the harsh punishment administered to Strohmeyer, Nevada
authorities never considered indicting Cash because he did not play an
active role in either the molestation or the murder. As a Las Vegas
Police Sergeant involved in the case lamented, "[t]here is no law re-
quiring citizens to report a crime... [or] to stop a crime.... There is
a moral obligation, but .. . people [are not arrested for] moral is-
sues."' 4 Not surprisingly, however, Sherrice Iverson's brutal mur-
der-a murder David Cash potentially could have prevented-
galvanized state and federal legislators to consider enacting such
laws.' 5
4. See John M. Glionna, Strohmeyer Partly Blames Others, Courts: Girl's Killer
Admits 'Monstrous' Deed, But Says Casinos, Internet, Cash Share Responsibility, L.A.
Times, Oct. 15, 1998, at Al. Sherrice's father, Leroy Iverson, took his daughter and
her older half-brother to the casino that evening. See id. Mr. Iverson, however, was
apparently gambling elsewhere in the casino when Strohmeyer assaulted and mur-
dered his daughter. See Patrick Rogers et al., Scot Free: Though He Might Have
Stopped a 7-Year-Old Girl's Murder, David Cash Gets on with His Life, Untouched by
the Law, People, Sept. 28, 1998, at 139, 141.
5. See Glionna, supra note 4. Cash maintains that he initially followed Stroh-
meyer and Sherrice into the restroom. See 60 Minutes, supra note 2. Strohmeyer
forced Sherrice into a stall and locked the door. See id. Cash entered the adjoining
stall and peered over the top. See id. He observed Strohmeyer restraining Sherrice
and holding his hand over her mouth in an attempt to muffle her screams. See id.
Cash tapped his friend on the head but received no response. See id.
6. See 60 Minutes, supra note 2.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Glionna, supra note 4.
13. See id.
14. Rogers et al., supra note 4.
15. See Caren Benjamin, Lawyers Say Care Needed in Writing Good Samaritan
Laws, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Sept. 13, 1998, at 1B (describing the reaction by state and
federal legislators as a "national gag reflex over... [David Cash's] deadly inaction").
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The Sherrice Iverson Act,'6 the law proposed at the federal level,
was introduced in the Senate by Barbara Boxer of California and in
the House by Nick Lampson of Texas on September 9, 1998.17 The
Act proposed an amendment to the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act ("CAPTA")18 that required states to pass legislation
imposing a criminal penalty on witnesses to child sexual abuse who
failed to report the abuse. 9 States that chose not to implement such
laws would be ineligible for the federal funding CAPTA provides.20
Although the Act initially expired along with the 105th Congress, Sen-
ator Boxer reintroduced the bill on April 14, 1999.1
This Note argues against the implementation of the Sherrice Iver-
son Act. Undoubtedly, the proposition and re-introduction of the bill
indicates a well-intentioned commitment to addressing the inactive
bystander phenomenon. As critics of good samaritan laws have
pointed out, however, only legislation that develops out of systemic
problems can result in good public policy.2- Laws passed to express
disgust with one personz ' or to react to a single event, however, are
less likely to produce meaningful results because the incidence of
cases to which the law would apply fails to justify its enactment.2 4
While child abuse is a "tragedy of growing proportions"'  and thus,
arguably, a systemic problem, states already have mandatory child
16. S. 2452, 105th Cong. (1998).
17. See id.
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994). The federal government first enacted the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA") in 1974. See id. The Act
grants money to the states for the identification, prevention, and treatment of child
abuse. See id. § 5104(b)(1), amended by CAPTA Amendments of 1996, Pub. L No.
104-235, § 104, 110 Stat. 3063, 3066. A state's eligibility for such funding depends on
the statutory implementation of mandatory reporting of suspected or known child
abuse. See id. § 5106a(b)(1)(A). The statute must provide the reporter with immunity
from civil and criminal liability. See id. § 5106a(b)(1)(B). It must also provide for the
investigation of reports by the proper state authorities, and in the case of substanti-
ated reports, the statute must provide for the welfare of the abused children. See id.
§ 5106a(b)(2); see also Caroline T. Trost, Note, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Re-
thinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 Vand. L Rev. 183, 207-08 (1998) (arguing that
CAPTA's 1996 amendments, including a "'good faith' immunity provision" and a
"new emphasis on assessment," will have a "chilling effect on child abuse reporting").
19. See S. 2452.
20. See id.
21. See S. 793, 106th Cong. (1999).
22. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 3 (interview with criminal defense attorney
Elizabeth Semil) ("[A] piece of legislation... must be in response ... to a systemic
problem.... [W]ith regard to people's failure to act in a situation such as the Sherrice
Iverson case, [it is unclear] that we have a system-wide problem.").
23. See Steve Chapman, Should Doing Nothing About a Crime Be a Crime?, Las
Vegas Rev.-J., Aug. 31, 1998, at 7B.
24. See A. D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability,
69 Va. L. Rev. 1273, 1276 (1983).
25. Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement
of Olivia A. Golden, Acting Asst. Secretary for Children and Families, U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs.), available in 1996 WL 669985.
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abuse reporting statutes to deal with this crisis.26 Furthermore, the
futility of passing a duty to rescue or duty to report law is demon-
strated by the lack of convictions under eight different state statutes, 7
some of which have been on the books since the early 1970s, that are
similar to the law proposed by Senator Boxer and Representative
Lampson.
Part I of this Note explores the history and background of the "no
duty to rescue" rule,'2 both in tort and criminal law. This part sets
forth the traditional "no duty to rescue" rule, the reasons behind the
rule, a brief history of the rule's origins, and commentators' reactions
to the rule. Part II examines the gradual erosion of the "no duty to
rescue" rule. This part details some exceptions to the traditional rule,
including the special relationship exceptions, the physician good sa-
maritan laws, and the mandatory child abuse reporting statutes. Fi-
nally, this part analyzes the reasoning behind, and the criticism of,
these exceptions. Part III discusses the statutory abrogation of the
traditional rule evidenced by the good samaritan laws of eight states.
This part delineates the eight laws by breaking them into discernible
categories and discusses the legislative policies behind the laws. This
part also observes that the enactment of these statutes had little im-
pact. Part IV considers the implications of the erosion and statutory
abrogation of the traditional rule for the Sherrice Iverson Act. This
part concludes that the passage of the Sherrice Iverson Act would be
as futile as the passage of the eight state laws that impose similar
requirements.
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE
"No DUTY TO RESCUE" RULE
This part discusses the history and background of the traditional
rule. It presents the "no duty to rescue" rule, the justifications behind
the rule, and the rule's early development. This part also examines
the survival of the "no duty to rescue" rule despite relentless scholarly
attack.
A. The Traditional Rule and its Rationales
The traditional "no duty to rescue" rule is that "[t]he duty to pro-
tect against wrong is, generally speaking, and excepting certain inti-
mate relations in the nature of a trust, a moral obligation only, not
26. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
27. For a discussion of these eight statutes, see infra Part III.B.
28. The "no duty to rescue" rule is the term used to describe the phenomenon
whereby the law holds individuals responsible for only their actions, not for their fail-
ure to act. See Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965) and various scholars in an effort to set
out a brief history of the rule's origins). Good samaritan laws effectively abrogate the
"no duty to rescue" rule.
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recognized or enforced by law."'29 In other words, absent a special
relationship, an individual has no affirmative legal duty to rescue an-
other person in a perilous situation.3c Furthermore, an individual has
neither an affirmative legal duty to report to the authorities that an-
other individual is in danger31 nor a duty to warn a potential victim of
danger.3 2
Support for the traditional rule is found in the fact that the law has
historically drawn a sharp distinction between malfeasance (action)
and nonfeasance (inaction) in determining the existence of a duty.33
The importance of the distinction evolved from the common law.34
As one commentator has observed, "[the] government may put you in
jail for hurting someone, but not for declining to help someone." 3
The established defense of nonfeasance that justifies the law, there-
fore, "overrides the moral perceptions of the judges and the shared
attitudes of the community.
3 6
Because the common law imposed liability only for malfeasance, 37
statutes could impose punishment on individuals for the consequences
of their actions, but not for risks that they did not create and could not
control.38 Omissions or inaction could not give rise to liability be-
cause omissions, in and of themselves, do not cause harm.39 For in-
29. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H 1898).
30. See id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965) (setting forth the
basic tort law principle behind the traditional rule: "The fact that the actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does
not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."); Wayne R. LaFave &
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 203 (2d ed. 1986) (justifying the traditional rule by
describing the corresponding criminal law principle behind it, namely, that "one has
no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can be rendered
without danger or inconvenience to himself" (footnote omitted)).
31. See People v. Donelson, 359 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (observing
that no "case in any American jurisdiction directly hold[s] that a person commits an
offense by merely remaining silent as to the commission of an offense").
32. See Buch, 44 A. at 811.
33. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56,
at 373 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton] (arguing that the distinction af-
fects the imposition of a duty); Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a
Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217,219 (1908) (positing that the distinction
between action and inaction has a fundamental place in the common law).
34. See Bohlen, supra note 33, at 219; Weinrib, supra note 1, at 247.
35. Chapman, supra note 23; see also id. ("OJ Simpson's acquittal doesn't mean
we should scrap the jury system, and our inability to punish David Cash doesn't mean
we should abandon a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon legal systems."); infra
Part I.B. (discussing the arguments challenging the assumption that punishing some-
one for declining to help would require the abandonment of a fundamental principle
of the Anglo-Saxon system).
36. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 258.
37. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 675.
38. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 33, § 56, at 374-75.
39. See Bohlen, supra note 33, at 220-21; John T. Pardun, Comment, Good Samar-
itan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. LU. 591, 603 (1998)
(citing Lawrence C. Wilson, The Defense of Others-Criminal Law and the Good
Samaritan, 33 McGill L.J. 756, 811 (1988)).
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stance, liability in tort law is created when a defendant has a duty to
the plaintiff that the defendant breaches.4 ° If the defendant's breach
causes the plaintiff's harm, then the law imposes liability.41 Causation,
therefore, is a fundamental element of tort liability.42 In a situation
where an individual whose only "responsibility" for a plaintiff's injury
stems from the individual's choice not to rescue the plaintiff from a
dangerous situation, however, there is no causation, and therefore, no
liability under tort law.43
Besides the fact that a duty to rescue rule lacks causation, another
objection to the rule is that it represents an attempt at legislating mo-
rality. As one scholar has observed:
[A rule requiring rescue] would run counter to the liberal princi-
ples that inform our legal order....
[T]he proper function of law is to protect individual rights against
infringement. As long as a person refrains from injuring others, he
should be free to act as he wishes. It is inappropriate for the law to
require one person to act solely for the benefit of another.
Although there may be a moral obligation to aid others in distress,
the enforcement of moral precepts is beyond the legitimate prov-
ince of law.44
The merit of this objection rests on the proposition that, ideally, the
law serves a greater purpose than merely reflecting a community's
moral beliefs. 5
Further, a practical objection to a duty to rescue requirement is that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce. Some of the inherent
40. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 33, § 30, at 164-65.
41. See id. at 165.
42. See id.
43. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 200-
01 (1973) (arguing that because the absence of causation results in immunity from
liability, one does not have a duty to alleviate danger that one did not cause). But see
John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations
About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others,
1991 Wis. L. Rev. 867, 912-14 (arguing that the causation argument fails to justify the
"no duty to rescue" rule because none of the special relationship exceptions to the
rule require causation). For a discussion of these special relationship exceptions to
the rule, see infra Part II.A.
44. Heyman, supra note 1, at 676. Heyman asserts that libertarian writers such as
Richard Epstein, as well as others critical of liberalism's preoccupation with violations
of personal autonomy, articulate this objection to the "no duty to rescue" rule most
forcefully. See id. at 676 nn.11-12.
45. See id. at 676. Some who advocate for legislating morality, however, believe
that the power of good samaritan laws to articulate a community's attitude toward
misbehavior and to teach right and wrong sufficiently justifies the laws' enactment.
See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 56-58 (1993). To these advo-
cates, a good samaritan law might "reinforce and value the deeds of those who al-
ready practice the ethic involved, while encouraging the broader development of
similar behavior and attitudes." Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverish-
ment of Political Discourse 88 (1991).
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problems with enforcement include determining whether a particular
situation required an "easy" or "difficult" rescue,46 whether a poten-
tial rescuer actually realized the extent of the victim's peril,47 and, in
the case of a group rescue, which potential rescuers owed what
duties.'
B. The Development of the "No Duty to Rescue" Rule
The common law did impose some affirmative duties as a matter of
public or criminal law.49 For example, dating back to the mid-thir-
teenth century, every person had a legal duty to prevent a felony.5
The law imposed criminal sanctions on individuals who failed to inter-
vene when they knew a felony was being committed and had the abil-
ity to prevent it.51 This duty manifested a "general principle of the
traditional legal system" that the government's duty to protect indi-
viduals from violence came at a price: in the absence of a governmen-
tal "officer," individuals were required to protect each other.52 The
advent of modem police forces in the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, contributed to the elimination of this duty.53
46. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
48. See infra note 229-31 and accompanying text.
49. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 677.
50. See id at 685. In 1907, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in dicta, observed that
"it is the duty of a man who sees a felony attempted by violence to prevent it if
possible." State v. Hennessy, 90 P. 221, 226 (Nev. 1907). Ironically, if this had been
the state of the law in Nevada in 1997, prosecutors might have been able to charge
David Cash, Jr. with a crime.
51. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 677.
52. Id at 678. This historical duty to prevent felonies provides a basis for a duty to
rescue grounded in an individual's obligations as a member of a community. See id. at
680. Relational-feminist legal scholars propose a similar justification for a duty to
rescue rule. They consider the victim in need of rescue as an interconnected human
being. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. Legal
Educ. 3, 32-35 (1988). Therefore, when one rescues another in trouble one does so
out of an obligation to one's community, not just to an individual. See id. ("NVhy
should our autonomy or freedom not to rescue weigh more heavily in the law than a
stranger's harm and the consequent harms to the people with whom she is
interconnected?").
53. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 689; see also Jack Wenik, Note, Forcing the By-
stander to Get Involve&L A Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime, 94
Yale L.J 1787, 1796 (1985) (suggesting that imposing a duty to rescue on individuals
might interfere with the work of criminal justice officials). Recently, however, soci-
ety has recognized that private citizens may need to assist police officers in preventing
crime. See Heyman supra note 1, at 689 (discussing how the prevention of crime re-
quires more than society's reliance on the police); Wenik, supra, at 1787 (arguing that
a duty to report significantly increases the chance of apprehending criminals). The
passage by certain states of good samaritan legislation that imposes both a duty to
report and to rescue exemplifies this recognition. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 689
n.66; infra Part III (discussing these laws in depth).
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Another affirmative duty imposed by common public law was the
now dormant offense of misprison of felony,54 which resembled the
modem-day duty to report statutes. One was liable for misprison of
felony if he failed to report a felony that he knew of and had reason-
able opportunity to disclose without harm. 6 The offense is in "virtual
desuetude" because many considered it "anachronistic, strikingly
close to accessorial liability in form, and threatening to the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. '57 Therefore, no
state court since 1878 has upheld a conviction under this early duty to
report law.58 Thus, both the early duty to rescue and duty to report
laws imposing criminal penalties fell out of favor over a century ago.
Like those historically imposed in the public or criminal law con-
text, there were a few affirmative duties in the field of torts that cre-
ated liability.59 In early tort law, for instance, actions of trespass on
the case6" could involve nonfeasance in situations where a duty was
based on an affirmative undertaking by the defendant.61 There were
also situations where the defendant had affirmative obligations even
when he had no such undertaking. For instance, an innkeeper had a
duty to a traveler, and a landowner owed a duty to prevent the flood-
ing of a neighbor's land through the repair of adjoining sea walls.62 In
these situations, the distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance
was viewed as less significant than it traditionally had been.63 These
were conspicuous exceptions, however, and as a matter of private
common law, the "no duty to rescue" rule has essentially always had a
proverbial home.6'
Courts and commentators have consistently found the law's "persis-
tent[ ] refus[al] to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of com-
54. See Yeager, supra note 45, at 30; see also Wenik, supra note 53, at 1791 (argu-
ing that disagreement about misprision of felony is not limited to how the defense is
defined, but whether the offense ever existed in the first place).
55. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 423, 427 n.35, 428 (1985) (observing that the reporting statutes most
"closely resemble the common law ban against 'misprision of felony"'). For a discus-
sion of the duty to report statutes of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Florida, Washing-
ton, and Ohio, see infra Part III.
56. See LaFave & Scott, supra note 30, at 600 n.53.
57. Yeager, supra note 45, at 30 (footnotes omitted); see also Wenik, supra note
53, at 1792 (explaining the offense's virtual disappearance as a product of its vague
definition and because of its "incompatibil[ity] with modem society").
58. See Yeager, supra note 45, at 32.
59. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 685.
60. At common law, an action on the case, or the writ of trespass on the case, lay
for tangible injuries to person or property, other than those injuries considered "di-
rect and forcible." Prosser et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 3-4 (9th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter Prosser et al., Torts]. Actions for negligence, nuisance, and defamation,
among others, all developed out of the common law action on the case. See id. at 3.
61. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 684.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 684-85.
64. See id.
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mon humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in
danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life,"6 to be "mor-
ally outrageous."66 Thus, "[t]he absence in the common law of a gen-
eralized duty to rescue is ongoing fuel for professorial publication."'67
In light of the criticism that the traditional rule has faced, modem law
has carved out exceptions to the rule, whereby the law imposes duties
on certain individuals in certain situations. Part II examines these ex-
ceptions and their justifications.
II. THE EROSION OF THE "No DUTY TO RE-SCUE" RULE
Undoubtedly, the traditional rule has had remarkable endurance.
Exceptions to the "no duty to rescue" rule, however, may suggest that
a gradual erosion of this rule is inevitable. This part examines three
such exceptions: the special relationship exceptions imposed by tort
law, the physician good samaritan laws directed at encouraging doc-
tors to voluntarily render aid, and the mandatory child abuse report-
ing statutes of every state. This part also analyzes the arguments for
and against the capacity of these exceptions to erode the rule.
A. The Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
Although it has been observed that "[a] moral duty to take affirma-
tive action is not enough to impose a legal duty to do so,"'  criminal
65. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 33, § 56, at 375.
66. Weinrib, supra note 1, at 258.
67. Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and Inac-
tion in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from the
Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 Duq. L. Rev. 807, 830 n.95 (1995). One
legal scholar in favor of the rule's abrogation notes that because of the law's utilita-
rian function, it follows that laws exist to serve society's needs. See Heyman, supra
note 1, at 674-76. A more utilitarian law would require an individual to come to the
aid of another if one could do so easily. See id at 674-75. As another commentator
has observed:
Critics of the common-law position have generally proposed that the
courts ought to recognize a duty to effect what might be termed an easy
rescue, that is, a duty that would arise whenever one person is caught in a
dangerous situation that another can alleviate at no significant cost to
himself.
Weinrib, supra note 1, at 250 (footnote omitted). A duty to rescue rule, therefore,
would ultimately serve the needs of society more efficiently. See Heyman, supra note
1, at 674-75. But see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal
Stud. 83, 119-21 (1978) (arguing that a "no duty to rescue" rule is efficient because
potential rescuers would otherwise avoid rescue situations if a duty requiring rescue
existed). No recorded case categorically accepts the notion of imposing a legal duty
on an individual even if carrying out that duty requires little effort. See Adler, supra
note 43, at 868. Adler observes, however, a trend in the law toward imposing duties,
for before 1962 only three recorded cases implicated § 314 of the Restatement-the
section concerned with duties-but from the mid-1980s until 1991, twenty cases per
year implicated this same section. See id at 877 & n.41.
68. LaFave & Scott, supra note 30, at 203.
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law does impose penalties in some circumstances for failing to come to
the aid of another.69 Similarly, tort law also has a host of exceptions
to the no-duty to rescue rule.7 ° Some scholars contend that these ex-
ceptions have contributed to a gradual erosion of the traditional "no
duty to rescue" rule. This section addresses these contentions.
69. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.01(3) (1962) (stating that "[1liability for the
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action
unless ... a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law").
70. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965) (describing special re-
lationships that give rise to a duty to aid). The Restatement sections on exceptions to
the "no duty to rescue" rule include §§ 314A, 314B, 315, 321, 322, and 324. Excerpts
from the exceptions are provided below because of the important role they play in
determining whether an individual has a duty to aid in the absence of an affirmative
act. The relevant parts read as follows:
§ 314A. Special Relationships Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reason-
able action
(a) to protect them against ... harm...
(b) ....
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar
duty to members of the public...
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of
his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the
other.
§ 314B. Duty to Protect Endangered or Hurt Employee
(1) If a servant... comes into a position of imminent danger of serious
harm ... the master is subject to liability for a failure ... to exercise
reasonable care ....
§ 315. [Duty to Control Conduct of Third Persons]
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to pre-
vent him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
... or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other...
§ 321. Duty to Act When Prior Conduct is Found to be Dangerous
(1) If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize
that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to an-
other, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk
from taking effect
(2) ....
§ 322. Duty to Aid Another Harmed by Actor's Conduct
If the actor knows or has reason to know that by his conduct... he has
caused such bodily harm to another ... the actor is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent ... further harm.
§ 324. Duty to One Who Takes Charge of Another Who is Helpless
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is
helpless ... is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused
to him by
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the
safety of the other ... or
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection.
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1. Tort Law's Special Relationship Exception
The special relationship exception is the most common exception to
the "no duty to rescue" rule.7' The exception imposes an affirmative
duty that, if breached, can result in both civil and criminal penalties. 2
Generally, the relationships within the exception include those where
the potential victim has some special dependence on the potential res-
cuer, such as children to their parents or employees to their employ-
ers. 3 The category of relationships listed in the Restatement that
impose an affirmative duty to aid a potentially reliant victim also spe-
cifically include common carriers to their passengers,74 innkeepers to
their guests,75 landholders to their invitees, 76 and masters to their ser-
vants.77 Despite this exhaustive list, it has been observed that "in
many situations it is difficult to determine what constitutes a special
relationship. 7 8
A duty to aid also arises when an individual's prior conduct creates
a risk of possibly causing harm to another,79 when one's conduct has
caused bodily harm, 0 and when one begins to help an injured per-
son.8 ' Other duties to aid can be based on contract,82 statuteas or
because a special relationship exists between the rescuer and a third
party, imposing a duty on the rescuer to control the third party.,
2. Statutory Exceptions
In addition to tort law's special relationship exceptions to the "no
duty to rescue" rule, statutory exceptions exist as well. These include
the physician good samaritan statutes and mandatory child abuse re-
porting statutes.
71. See Adler, supra note 43, at 886.
72. See Biggs, supra note 1, at 228-30 (discussing criminal penalties imposed when
a special relationship exists); Mary Kate Kearney, Breaking the Silence. Tort Liability
for Failing to Protect Children fronz Abuse, 42 Buff. L Rev. 405, 411-14 (1994) (dis-
cussing the special relationship exceptions in the context of tort law).
73. See Adler, supra note 43, at 886-87.
74. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(1).
75. See id § 314A(2).
76. See i. § 314A(3).
77. See id. § 314A(4).
78. Adler, supra note 43, at 886.
79. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321.
80. See iUL § 322.
81. See id § 324.
82. See Biggs, supra note 1, at 228.
83. See id at 229-30
84. See id. at 228-29; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 ("There is no
duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physi-
cal harm to another unless... a special relation exists between the actor and the third
person .. ").
1999] 3179
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
a. Physician Good Samaritan Laws
In 1959, doctors in California lobbied for, and the legislature
passed, the first good samaritan law "reliev[ing] physicians who ren-
dered emergency aid from the traditional duty of due care."8 Relief
from the traditional duty meant that an accident victim could no
longer hold a doctor liable for negligently contributing to that victim's
injury during a rescue attempt.86 According to the law, the victim had
a cause of action only if the doctor acted with gross negligence or in
bad faith.87
Today, the legislatures of every state and the District of Columbia
have passed good samaritan laws, designed to encourage physicians to
render emergency aid at the scene of an accident.88 These statutes
reduce the standard of care owed by doctors who voluntarily offer
such aid, "imposing liability only for gross negligence or bad faith."8 9
The lowered standard ideally induces physicians who drive past an ac-
cident victim by the side of the road to stop and assist that victim.
Physician good samaritan laws do not impose an affirmative duty to
rescue or to report. They should not, therefore, be confused with the
good samaritan statutes that do impose such duties.90 These laws,
however, are still appropriately categorized as exceptions to the "no
duty to rescue" rule. By reducing the standard of care and promoting
voluntary rescue, physician good samaritan laws encourage those that
can help others to do so. The law facilitates an individual's ability to
carry out a self-imposed duty to a stranger and, therefore, arguably
contributes to the gradual erosion of the "no duty to rescue" rule.
b. Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes
Mandatory child abuse reporting statutes, enacted in all fifty
states,9 exemplify another exception to the "no duty to rescue" rule.
This exception resembles the special relationship exceptions because
the statutes impose duties on those who have a particular relationship
to a child.9"
85. Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 51,
52 (1972); see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2395 (West 1990) (relieving licensees who
render "emergency care at the scene of an accident of liability for civil damages").
86. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 51-52.
87. See id at 52 n.12.
88. See Biggs, supra note 1, at 232-33 n.40 (listing the physician good samaritan
statutes of a number of states).
89. Silver, supra note 55, at 428. While some of these states' statutes apply only to
doctors, others apply to all licensed medical personnel and to all individuals who vol-
unteer aid. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 52 n.12.
90. See infra Part III.
91. See Trost, supra note 18, at 194-95 n.63 (providing an exhaustive list of these
statutes).
92. See supra Part II.A.1.
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Child abuse in this country is not a "recent phenomeno[n]";9
rather, it is a "staggeringly rife and tragically important" 94 age-old epi-
demic. It did not secure its identity as a "medical condition," how-
ever, until the 1962 publication of C. Henry Kempe's article The
Battered Child Syndrome.95 The article stimulated the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Children's Bureau to
hold a conference to determine how to best combat the country's re-
cently identified affliction.96 The exploration led to the passage of the
mandatory child abuse reporting statute as the most favored
remedy.97
By June 1967, all fifty states had enacted mandatory child abuse
reporting statutes.98 After their initial enactment, the statutes under-
went significant changes. 99 The first generation of mandatory child
abuse reporting laws imposed a duty on physicians to report suspected
child abuse solely at their own discretion."0  Eventually, however,
doctors lost the option to report, and the statutes mandated that phy-
sicians report all serious physical and non-accidental injuries.10 1
These statutes were broadened further through extension of the duty
to include all child-care professionals' 2 and expansion of the list of
the "injuries" deemed report-worthy to include child sexual abuse and
neglect. 10 3
All of the mandatory child abuse reporting statutes have seven ba-
sic elements."° These include: (1) a definition of conditions worthy
93. Marjorie R. Freiman, Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the
Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 Geo. Wash. Rev. 243, 243 (1982).
94. Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn. L Rev. 723, 725
(1987).
95. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. Am. Med.
Ass'n 17, 17 (1962); see also Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws:
Tune for a Change, 20 Fam. L.Q. 141, 142 (1986) (suggesting that Kempe's article
"stimulated" widespread concern about child abuse); Trost, supra note 18, at 191 (dis-
cussing the significance of Kempe's article); Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota:
Mandated Reporting and the Unequal Protection ofAbused Children, 24 Win. Mitchell
L. Rev. 131, 135 (1998) (observing that Kempe's work inspired consideration of the
first model child abuse reporting statute).
96. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 142.
97. See id
98. See Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part L" Historical Over-
view, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 332 (1972).
99. See Leonard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Domestic Torts: Family Violence, Con-
ffict and Sexual Abuse § 10.03, at 397 (1989); see also Mitchell, supra note 94, at 727
(observing that since the 1960s, most states have amended their reporting statutes at
least once).
100. See Vieth, supra note 95, at 135.
101. See id.
102. See Robin A. Rosencrantz, Note, Rejecting "Hear No Evil Speak No Evil":
Expanding the Attorney's Role in Child Abuse Reporting, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 327,
340-41 (1995).
103. See Vieth, supra note 95, at 135.
104. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 143.
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of reporting; 0 5 (2) a list of the persons required to report;10 6 (3) the
degree of certainty necessary to warrant reporting the suspected
abuse; 10 7 (4) penalties imposed for failure to report;108 (5) criminal
and/or civil immunity available to reporters; 10 9 (6) abrogation of cer-
tain/all confidential communication privileges;" 0 and (7) delineation
105. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.17.290(2) (Michie 1998) (defining reportable condi-
tions broadly to include "physical injury or neglect, mental injury, sexual abuse ... or
maltreatment"); see also Idaho Code § 16-1602(a) (1979 & Supp. 1998) (defining re-
portable conditions more precisely to include specific injuries such as "skin bruising"
or "burns").
106. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 11165.7-11165.10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999)
(mandating that child care custodians, medical practitioners, child protective agency
personnel, and commercial film and photographic print processors report abuse). In
most states, the statutory list of reporters includes teachers, day-care personnel, foster
parents, physicians, nurses, dentists, social workers, psychologists, marriage and fam-
ily counselors, and law enforcement officers. See Inger J. Sagatun & Leonard P. Ed-
wards, Child Abuse and the Legal System 37 (1995). Essentially, the statutory list of
reporters includes all professionals who work with children. See id. at 10. State legis-
lators widened the category of reporters to "arrest the tremendous increase in child
abuse" during the 1980s. Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending
Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating that Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1, 4 (1991).
107. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.504 (West 1998) (requiring that a reporter
"know[ ] or ha[ve] reasonable cause to suspect" that a child has suffered abuse); see
also Idaho Code § 16-1610 (Supp. 1998) (requiring that reporters have "reason to
believe" or actually "observe[ ]" the reportable condition). When a statute mandates
that a reporter have a "reasonable suspicion" about the suspected abuse, an objective
standard is applied to the reporter's determination. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at
146. If the statute does not provide that the reporter's belief or suspicion be reason-
able, a subjective standard applies. See id. The application of one standard versus the
other has a major impact on a prosecutor's ability to charge an individual with failure
to report. See id. A statute implementing an objective standard provides the prosecu-
tor with a greater chance of conviction. See id.
108. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-6.1 (1990) (defining the penalty for a failure
to report as a misdemeanor with a fine of not more than $500 and/or a prison sen-
tence of not more than one year, or both).
109. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 419 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1999) (providing
civil or criminal immunity for good faith reporting, the good faith of which is
presumed).
110. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3620 (G), (H) (West Supp. 1998) (abrogat-
ing all privileges but that of attorney-client). The statutes eliminate certain confiden-
tial communication privileges to facilitate effective reporting. See O'Brien &
Flannery, supra note 106, at 26. Most of them abolish the doctor-patient privilege and
the spousal privilege. See id. Other states specifically eliminate the privileges of psy-
chotherapists, psychologists, and social workers. See id. at 26-27 & nn.137-41 (listing
examples of these statutes). For an article focusing on the abrogation of the privilege
between psychotherapists and their patients, see, for example, Murray Levine, A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by
Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 711, passim (1993) (arguing that the
mandated reporting requirement on psychotherapists has both negative and positive
consequences for the psychotherapy relationship). States tend to abrogate the attor-
ney-client privilege and the clergy-communicant privilege only under certain circum-
stances. See O'Brien & Flannery, supra note 106, at 27-28. For articles focusing on the
abrogation of these two privileges within child-abuse reporting statutes, see Mitchell,
supra note 94, at 724 (arguing that the conflict between mandatory reporting statutes
and the clergy privilege is not "a choice between protecting secrets and protecting
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of the reporting procedures.'
In Nevada, where the physical and sexual assault of Sherrice Iver-
son that inspired the proposed federal law in her name occurred," 2
there is an extensive statutory list of individuals required to report the
"abuse or neglect" of a child." 3 These individuals include doctors of
various types, nurses, social workers, psychologists, marriage and fam-
ily counselors, hospital administrators, coroners, clergymen and reli-
gious healers (unless they have "acquired knowledge of the abuse or
neglect from the offender during a confession"), teachers, librarians,
school counselors, and attorneys." 4
Additionally, the Nevada statute provides that those not included in
the mandated list of reporters have the option of making a report of
suspected abuse or neglect."' The designated reporters must report if
they have "reason to believe that a child has been abused or ne-
glected.""' 6 Thus, Nevada requires individuals to make a subjective
determination as to whether or not to file a report. Once an individ-
ual suspects abuse, he or she must make a report "immediately," or
within twenty-four hours, to agencies providing protective services or
law enforcement. 117 The statute provides civil and criminal immunity
children"); O'Brien & Flannery, supra note 106, at 6 (contending that the state's in-
terest served by the clergy privilege outweighs its interest in protecting children
through mandatory reporting statutes); Rosencrantz, supra note 102, at 327 n.2 (sug-
gesting that attorneys should be included in list of mandatory reporters); Lisa M.
Smith, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes May
Encourage the Catholic Church to Report Priests Who Molest Children, 18 Law &
Psychol. Rev. 409, 409 (1994) (arguing that mandatory reporting statutes should be
used as a legal tool to stop Catholic Church officials from protecting priests who mo-
lest children).
111. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§ 12-12-502-12-12-515 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997)
(requiring, among other things, immediate report by telephone, followed by a written
report within 48 hours).
112. See supra notes 4-21 and accompanying text.
113. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 432B.220(2)(a)-(j) (Michie 1996).
114. See id. § 432B.220(2)(a)-(e), (i). Attorneys need not report the abuse or ne-
glect of a child if they "acquired the knowledge of the abuse or neglect from a client
who is or may be accused of the abuse or neglect." Id. § 432B.220(2)(i).
115. See id. § 432B.220(3). Some argue that the majority of reports of those who do
so voluntarily are often unsubstantiated. See Karp, supra note 99, at 398. The statutes
of 16 states consider all individuals who suspect child abuse to be mandatory report-
ers. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (1995); Idaho Code § 16-1610 (1979 & Supp.
1998); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-33-5-1-31-33-6-3 (Michie 1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 620.030 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996); Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 5-705 (1991 &
Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-353 (1993 & Supp. 1998); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-
711 (1995); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1993); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-4-1-32A-4-
22 (Michie 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-543 (1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 846
(West 1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-3 (1990 & Supp. 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-
403 (1996); Tex. Far. Code Ann. § 261.101 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 33, § 4913 (1991 & Supp. 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann § 14-3-205 (Michie 1997). These
statutes are effectively duty to report statutes not unlike those discussed below. See
infra Part II.B.4.
116. Nev. Stat. Ann. § 432B.220(1).
117. See id.
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to all individuals who make good faith reports." 8 Furthermore, in any
proceeding to impose liability on a reporter, there is a presumption
that the reporter acted in good faith. 19 Finally, Nevada's statute pro-
hibits persons required to report from invoking certain privileges. 120
B. Justifications for the Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
The exceptions to the "no duty to rescue" rule represent a "choice
to retain liability for some omissions which are considered morally
unacceptable.'' 1 2 For instance, the victim's dependent relationship to
the rescuer in the case of some of the special relationships justifies the
imposition of an obligation to rescue or to protect. Moreover, the ex-
ceptions may indicate that the importance of the distinction between
malfeasance and nonfeasance gives way to social policy considerations
when the relationship in question includes a rescuer who holds power
over the welfare of a "vulnerable and dependent" victim.'
22
Furthermore, at least one scholar views the early duty to report and
to rescue laws' 3 as evidence that the distinction between malfeasance
and nonfeasance, in fact, lacked a fundamental place in the common
law.' 24 This conclusion challenges the distinction's role as the basis
for the traditional rule, and subsequently justifies the rule's erosion
through exceptions. According to this reasoning, the exceptions to
the rule illustrate how little the distinction between inaction and ac-
tion matters, and should ultimately lead to the rule's reformation. 2 5
Critics of the traditional rule also point to the purported success of
the exceptions as further evidence to support their position. For in-
118. See id. § 432B.160(1)(a).
119. See id. § 432B.160(2).
120. See id. § 432B.250.
121. State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Wis. 1986).
122. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 33, § 56, at 374.
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 677-85.
125. See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, supra note 33, § 56, at 377 (proposing that the
broadening of the category of exceptions to the "no duty to rescue" rule may result in
a general imposition of a duty); Adler, supra note 43, at 869 (sugges°  that although
courts "pay lip service to these traditional common law rules," they unLmately distort
the rules to reach decisions that comply with public policy concerns); Kearney, supra
note 72, at 410 (arguing that exceptions to the "no duty to rescue" rule manifest the
problems inherent in the distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance); Weinrib,
supra note 1, at 279 (observing that the recognition of the existence of a moral duty to
rescue by those who defend the rule suggests the inevitability of the rule's further
erosion).
In contrast to the United States, most European countries impose a duty to rescue.
See Aleksander W. Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in The
Good Samaritan and the Law 91, 91-92 (James M. Ratcliffe ed. 1966). Some of these
countries include Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Russia, Turkey, Denmark,
Poland, Germany, Rumania, France, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and
Belgium. See id. Some commentators conclude that Europe's "long and widespread
use" of good samaritan laws supports the implementation of similar laws in the
United States. Woozley, supra note 24, at 1290.
[Vol. 673184
BYSTANDER INDIFFERENCE
stance, in regard to physician good samaritan laws, studies indicated
that, prior to the enactment of these laws, doctors had resisted render-
ing aid to victims at accident scenes because they feared consequent
litigation. 26 A partial immunity from liability, advocates argue, di-
minishes doctors' fears and produces physicians more willing to be-
have as good samaritans. 127
Similarly, the purpose of mandatory child abuse legislation is to
"identify children believed to have been abused by ensuring that cases
of suspected child abuse are properly identified and reported."'"
Proponents of reporting statutes suggest that the statutes have un-
doubtedly succeeded, producing an increase in reported cases of child
abuse and neglect.129 In the thirty years since the Children's Bureau
created the first model statute, the number of reports has increased
dramatically. 3 ' In 1963, 150,000 reports of child abuse were made; in
1972, child protection agencies documented 610,000 reports; in 1986,
they documented 2.1 million reports; and in 1995, the number rose to
three million.' 3 ' Without the passage of reporting statutes, these com-
mentators contend, the majority of incidents now attended to might
otherwise go unreported. 32
Advocates of these exceptions to the "no duty to rescue" rule argue
that the exceptions solve problems that the traditional rule creates, 3
and that they do, in fact, have the power to affect society's moral cli-
mate in certain circumstances." 4 To replace the traditional rule, one
scholar has proposed the following standard: "[Niothing more nor
less than an obligation to act reasonably under the circumstances un-
less, on balance, there are recognized policy concerns that militate
against the imposition of that duty."'1 35
126. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 52.
127. See id. at 52-53.
128. Meriwether, supra note 95, at 149.
129. See Sagatun & Edwards, supra note 106, at 37.
130. See Rosencrantz, supra note 102, at 341-42.
131. See Vieth, supra note 95, at 135.
132. See Sagatun & Edwards, supra note 106, at 37. Further, evidence suggests that
the reports of individuals acting under pain of statutory penalty produce the highest
number of substantiated investigations. See Vieth, supra note 95, at 137.
133. See Wenik, supra note 53, at 1800.
134. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. These advocates also suggest that a
duty to rescue is no more intrusive on one's autonomy than current impositions such
as testifying as a wvitness to a crime, serving on a jury, or paying taxes. See Yeager,
supra note 45, at 47-48.
135. Adler, supra note 43, at 870. But see Rowe & Silver, supra note 67, at 845
(criticizing Adler for proposing nothing more than an elimination of the distinction
between malfeasance and nonfeasance and a suggestion that its replacement be "bet-
ter"). In Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1989), the court drew a
similar conclusion to Adler when considering the duty of a passenger who gave the
keys to a car over to its intoxicated owner.
An enlightened society should no longer excuse the immoral and outra-
geous conduct of a person who allows another to drown, simply because he
doesn't wish to get his feet wet. Society demands more than that of its citi-
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C. Criticism of the Exceptions to the Traditional Rule
Critics of the special relationship exceptions support their argu-
ments in numerous ways, but they generally agree that courts have
applied these exceptions inconsistently. 136 These critics contend that
the duties imposed when one's conduct creates a possible risk, when
one's conduct actually injures another, and when one has begun help-
ing another 137 do not even belong on the list of special relationship
exceptions because they do not represent examples of nonfeasance. 13
Additionally, many find absurd the imposition of a criminal penalty
on one who begins helping another but stops, when no penalty is im-
posed on an individual who sees another in need of help and looks the
other way. 13 9 The notion that a relationship between employers and
their employees is "special" and therefore worthy of the imposition of
a duty to aid, but the relationship between a neighbor and a neigh-
bor's child is that of two strangers warranting no duty, appears equally
incongruous. 140
Criticism of the physician good samaritan law exception focuses on
the fact that the statutes have produced almost no litigation, which
suggests that they have had no effect on how physicians behave when
they confront accident victims in need of emergency care.' 4' Notably,
when California passed the original good samaritan law, 14 2 there were
no reported cases of accident victims suing doctors who stopped to
zens. It demands that a person exercise a duty of care towards another per-
son in order to insure that the other person remains free from harm, if he
can do so without peril to himself. And it demands an atmosphere in which
all persons will expect that others will conduct themselves in such a manner.
Id. at 1189. A discussion of whether the "no duty to rescue" rule should be replaced
with a general duty of reasonable care under the circumstances is beyond the scope of
this Note. Applying negligence principles to these situations, however, arguably pro-
vides a better solution than the creation of a new federal criminal law.
136. See Adler, supra note 43, at 896-97; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a therapist owed a duty of care, not to
control the conduct of a dangerous patient, but to the victim of that patient); Soldano
v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 317 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding a bartender owed a
duty to the plaintiff's decedent to permit a patron to call the police in an emergency
or to place the call himself); Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976)
(holding that the relationship between two friends was within the special relationship
exception to the "no duty to rescue" rule because they were "companions on a social
venture" when one was seriously injured).
137. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 321-322, 324 (1965).
138. See Adler, supra note 43, at 898-99; Kearney, supra note 72, at 411-13.
139. See Adler, supra note 43, at 922.
140. See Yeager, supra note 45, at 9-11 (advocating for a duty to rescue rule, though
acknowledging the difficulties in enforcing such rules and the lack of proof regarding
their deterrent effect).
141. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 53.
142. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2395 (West 1990).
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help them. 4 3 The absence of case law may indicate that the doctors'
fears were exaggerated and that the law was unnecessary. " '
Similarly, critics of the mandatory child abuse reporting statute ex-
ception argue that the laws are ineffective in curbing child abuse.'
Though the statutes may influence the rising number of reports, child
protective agencies continue to fail to identify and help abused and
neglected children.'46 Furthermore, these critics interpret the increase
in the number of reported cases of child abuse differently than do the
statutes' advocates. For instance, one commentator attributes the in-
crease in the reports of child abuse from 1.4 million in 1986 to 2.8
million in 1994 to an increase in incidents of abuse; 4 7 therefore, the
increased reporting does not necessarily reflect the statutes' ability to
raise the level of consciousness among a greater number of mandated
reporters.148
Some commentators argue that the drafting of these statutes raises
questions as to their efficacy as well.14 9 The mandatory child abuse
reporting statutes of the fifty states manifest great "disparities in lan-
guage and, therefore, effect."' 0 Indeed, because the provisions vary
considerably from state to state, an abused child receives differing de-
grees of protection depending upon the state in which that child
lives.15' Moreover, the differences make it impossible to accurately
ascertain how many children suffer from abuse and neglect. 5' If the
actual number of abused children remains a mystery, it is difficult to
measure the success of the reporting statutes. 53
One provision that differs considerably from one statute to another
is the definition of "reportable abuse."'14 Critics maintain that
143. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 52-53.
144. See id. at 53; see also Woozley, supra note 24, at 1276 (noting that more than 20
years after California passed its law, "there [was] no known case in the United States
of a malpractice suit being brought against a doctor who responded to a roadside or
other emergency outside his office; and to anyone who appreciates what trigger-happy
litigants Americans are that is a significant fact" (footnote omitted)).
145. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 141; see also Freiman, supra note 93, at 268-
71 (concluding that existing reporting laws are inadequate to protect a growing
number of abused children).
146. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 141.
147. See Jean Peters-Baker, Note, Punishing the Passive Parent. Ending a Cycle of
Violence, 65 UMKC L. Rev. 1003, 1003 (1997).
148. See id.
149. See Freiman, supra note 93, at 267-68. Problems of drafting also arise in the
context of the eight good samaritan laws discussed below. See infra Part III.
150. Meriwether, supra note 95, at 143.
151. See Frieman, supra note 93, at 251-52.
152. See id. at 248-49.
153. See id. at 248-50.
154. See Mitchell, supra note 94, at 729-32. Other statutory provisions that vary
considerably from state to state are the speed with which reporters must report after
they originally suspect the abuse and the agencies to which reporters deliver their
suspicions. See Freiman, supra note 93, at 260-61. Those that allow reporting to more
than one agency "invite[ I confusion and lack of coordination." Id. Additionally,
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problems arise if the statute defines the abuse too broadly or too nar-
rowly.15 5 A broad statute inevitably leads to over-reporting, which
not only overburdens already-taxed child protection agencies, 56 but
also contributes to an even greater number of unsubstantiated re-
ports.1 57 Conversely, a narrow statute can lead to under-reporting. t58
Further, a statute with an unclear definition renders reporters incapa-
ble of applying a uniform standard to suspected abuse.' 5 9
The inherent difficulty in defining abuse may also render reporting
laws incapable of the "clarity constitutionally required of ... statute[s]
carrying criminal sanctions.' 16  Therefore, the complexities and
"competing considerations" inherent in defining child abuse, and even
in the statutes themselves, may be incapable of reconciliation.16 ' Be-
cause the legislation's effectiveness depends on actual intervention, a
"plethora of reporting laws" without an "influx of services" could
compromise the power of these laws to curb child abuse. 6 ' Although
an individual's failure to report the suspected abuse of a child may be
a "morally unacceptable" omission, creating exceptions to the tradi-
tional rule may not necessarily be the proper response.
Despite the existence of the special relationship exception to the
traditional "no duty to rescue" rule, physician good samaritan laws,
and mandatory child abuse reporting laws, several states went even
further in an attempt to call otherwise innocent bystanders into action.
Part III discusses the effect of these attempts.
some states only require the reporting of children abused by their caretakers, see
Vieth, supra note 95, at 133-34, while others require reports only of very recent abuse.
See Sagatun & Edwards, supra note 106, at 37-38.
155. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 149-50 (pointing out that if the statutory
definition is too narrow, abused children risk going unprotected, but if it is too broad,
the state risks an unwarranted intrusion into a family's privacy); see also Freiman,
supra note 93, at 268 (concluding that many states' statutes have "unclear definitions
of reportable conditions"). The Supreme Court of Texas criticized its state's broad
reporting statute because the statute "conditions the requirement to report on these
difficult judgment calls [and] does not clearly define what conduct is required in many
conceivable situations." Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 307-08 (Tex. 1998).
156. See Freiman, supra note 93, at 262 (arguing that over-reporting puts too great
a demand on a state's investigative services).
157. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 150; see also Sagatun & Edwards, supra note
106, at 38 (arguing that over-reporting occurs not only because reporters do not know
what child abuse "means," but also because they fear criminal or civil liability if they
fail to report).
158. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 150-52; see also Vieth, supra note 95, at 137
(listing other reasons for under-reporting, such as ambiguity in the law and lack of
training of reporters); see also Freiman, supra note 93, at 262 (arguing that ignorance
of the laws leads to under-reporting).
159. See Meriwether, supra note 95, at 153-54.
160. Id. at 165.
161. Id. at 166.
162. Freiman, supra note 93, at 268; see also Levine, supra note 110, at 735 ("Pro-
tecting children depends on the availability of resources to serve children and families
adequately after a case is identified.").
3188 [Vol. 67
1999] BYSTANDER INDIFFERENCE 3189
IR. ABROGATION OF THE TRADITIONAL
"No DUTY TO RESCUE" RULE
This part analyzes the good samaritan laws that eight states have
enacted.163 This part briefly discusses the phenomenon whereby
tragic human events inspire good samaritan legislation. This part then
divides the good samaritan statutes of the eight states into discernible
categories, examines the policies behind the laws, and considers the
negligible effect of these laws.
A. The Murder of Kitty Genovese
Vermont's Duty to Aid the Endangered Act,"' the country's first
official abrogation of the traditional rule, was not inspired by a tragic
human event.' 65 Nevertheless, it is still appropriate to discuss the
163. Though some differences exist, the statutes of the eight states are essentially
the same. In 1989, the Minnesota Court of Appeals described the history of Minne-
sota's abrogation of the traditional rule beginning with the enactment of its physician
good samaritan law. See Tiedeman v. Morgan, 435 N.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989). The court could have been describing the history of the good samaritan laws of
any ' its seven sister states:
Recognizing the absence of a Good Samaritan duty, the Minnesota Legis-
lature first addressed the topic with a declaration of immunity for those who
volunteer to render emergency care. The declaration of immunity was later
accompanied by a statutory duty to volunteer reasonable assistance. It is
evident to us that these enactments deal with the historic Good Samaritan
law topic of volunteering assistance to one with whom a person has no spe-
cial relationship. Until modified by statute in 1983, no duty to volunteer
assistance existed. This statutory duty contrasts markedly with established
common law duties.
Id. (citations omitted).
164. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (effective Mar. 22, 1968).
165. Although one commentator claims that the murder of Kitty Genovese in 1964
in the Kew Gardens section of Queens inspireo Vermont's 1968 bill, he cites no au-
thority for this proposition. See Pardun, supra note 39, at 608. Furthermore, the arti-
cle cited most frequently as the leading authority on the history of Vermont's statute
mentions only the physician-inspired good samaritan legislation as the "primary moti-
vation behind the Vermont bill." Franklin, supra note 85, at 52 n.13. Another com-
mentator cited frequently for his work on the good samaritan laws of all eight states,
however, concludes that the 1983 rape of a woman on a pool table in a New Bedford,
Massachusetts bar inspired the laws passed after that year. See Yeager, supra note 45,
at 24 & n.114. Presumably, if one infers from the dates of enactment that the laws
were inspired by highly publicized events, then the Kitty Genovese case may well
have motivated the laws enacted in the late 1960s and very early 1970s. See Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 (Supp. 1999) (originally enacted as § 604.05 (1971); § 604.05(1)
(effective Aug. 1, 1983)); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519; Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 9.69.100 (West 1998) (effective 1970). Minnesota's 1971 statute offered immunity to
those who volunteered to render emergency aid. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.05 (West
1971). Presumably, it was merely a slightly broader versi %n of a physician-good sa-
maritan law. Genovese's murder, however, may have played a part in its passage. In
1983, Minnesota's legislature added a subdivision to the law that imposed an actual
duty to volunteer reasonable aid. See id. § 604.05(1) (Vest 1983). The aforemen-
tioned barroom rape, observed by numerous bar patrons, inspired the 1983 change to
the statute. See infra note 206; see also Biggs, supra note 1, at 234 ("In Minnesota, an
expanded duty to aid statute's sponsor was moved to introduce the bill by reports of
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1964 murder of Kitty Genovese. Not only do the majority of com-
mentators refer to the event when discussing the endurance of the "no
duty to rescue" rule in this country, 166 but the proximity of the event
to the enactment of this country's first good samaritan statute cannot
be ignored. 67
On the night of March 13th, 1964, Kitty Genovese was repeatedly
assaulted and eventually murdered outside of her apartment in
Queens, New York. 168 For over thirty-five minutes, Genovese's ag-
gressor repeatedly attacked her with a knife while she screamed and
crawled toward her apartment door. 69 Thirty-seven of Genovese's
neighbors listened to and watched the attack on the well-lit street, yet
they took no action whatsoever to assist her, not even placing a phone
call to the police.' 70 While the public was stunned at the brutality of
the murder, their shock intensified when they realized that the wit-
nesses had violated no law through their indifference. 17' As a result,
legal scholars advocated a change in the "no duty to rescue" rule.' 7 2
No state took any action, however, until four years later, when Ver-
mont enacted the Duty to Aid the Endangered Act. 73 Over the next
sixteen years, Minnesota, 74 Wisconsin,'75 Rhode Island, 76 Ohio, 77
the gang rape ... of a woman in a New Bedford, Mass., barroom . . . ." (footnote
omitted)).
166. See, e.g., Biggs, supra note 1, at 236 (questioning how the witnesses to Geno-
vese's murder would have been prosecuted if a duty to rescue law had existed in New
York in 1964); Heyman, supra note 1, at 677 (positing that "the traditional common
law may well have recognized a duty to act in cases like the murder of Catherine
Genovese"); Silver, supra note 55, at 423 (observing that Genovese's murder brought
"national attention" to "the issue of a legal duty to assist those in distress"); Woozley,
supra note 24, at 1276 & n.12 (questioning whether those who heard Genovese's
screams would be liable under a good samaritan law for failing to rescue, or only
those who saw her attacked); Yeager, supra note 45, at 20 n.94 (citing the murder of
Kitty Genovese as "the best-known case of bystander indifference"); Pardun, supra
note 39, at 608 (concluding that the murder of Genovese inspired the passage of Ver-
mont's good samaritan law).
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168. See Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 27, 1964, at 1; see generally A.M. Rosenthal, Thirty-Eight Witnesses passim
(1964) (offering a detailed account of Kitty Genovese's murder and a discussion of
Gansberg's New York Times article).
169. See Gansberg, supra note 168.
170. See id.
171. See Silver, supra note 55, at 423.
172. See supra note 3, 67 and accompanying text.
173. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519 (1973) (effective Mar. 22, 1968).
174. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1) (Supp. 1999) (originally enacted as § 604.05
(1971); § 604.05(1) (effective Aug. 1, 1983)).
175. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (effective Apr. 24,
1984).
176. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (1994) (effective 1984).
177. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22(A), (I) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1998)
(effective Jan. 1, 1974).
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Washington,178 Massachusetts,'179 and Florida"s all adopted similar
statutes.
B. A Categorical Analysis of the Eight Good Samaritan Statutes
While the eight good samaritan statutes are essentially similar, there
are slight differences between them. This section breaks the statutes
down into four primary categories and examines how each law fits
into each category.
1. Duty of Easy Rescue
The legislatures of seven of the eight states with good samaritan
laws have imposed duties of "easy rescue."'181 Regardless of whether
the statute requires a duty to simply report or to actually rescue, indi-
viduals must fulfill their duties only if they can do so "without danger
or peril to [themselves] or without interference with important duties
owed to others."'1" Two of these states do not require a duty if an-
other individual has already rendered aid," a while three states further
qualify the duty their statutes impose by requiring that the individual
need only render "reasonable" assistance. 84
178. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100(4) (West 1998) (effective 1970).
179. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40 (Law Co-op. 1992) (effective 1983).
180. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (effective 1984).
181. See id. § 794.027(4) (imposing a duty to report only when the reporter
"[w]ould not be exposed to any threat of physical violence for seeking such assist-
ance"); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40 (imposing a duty to report when one "can do so
without danger or peril to himself or others"); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1) (Supp.
1999) (originally enacted as § 604.05 (1971); § 604.05(1) effective Aug. 1, 1983) (im-
posing a "duty to assist... to the extent the person can do so without danger or peril
to self or others"); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (imposing a duty of "reasonable assist-
ance" when one can do so "without danger or peril to himself or herself or to
others"); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (effective Mar. 22, 1968) (imposing a
duty to "give reasonable assistance" only if it can be done so "vithout danger or peril
to himself or without interference with important duties owed to others"); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 9.69.100(4) (imposing no duty to report on an individual who "has a
reasonable belief that making such a report would place that person or another family
or household member in danger of immediate physical harm"); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 940.34(2)(d)(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (effective Apr. 24, 1984) (imposing no
duty if "[c]ompliance would place him or her in danger"). Ohio's statute is the only
one that does not explicitly state that the duty it imposes is one of "easy rescue." See
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22(A),(I).
182. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a).
183. See id; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(d)(3).
184. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-56-1.
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2. Duty to Victims of Crimes and of Acts of God
Vermont,' 85 Minnesota,' 8 6 and Rhode Island 187 impose on potential
rescuers a duty to a victim "that is exposed to grave physical harm."' 88
What constitutes "grave physical harm," however, is subject to inter-
pretation. The laws of these three states, therefore, potentially impose
a duty on those who know that a victim of a criminal act is in danger
or who know that a victim of an "act of God" is in similar peril. The
statutes of the other five states impose duties only to those victimized
by criminal acts,' 89 and not to a victim of a natural disaster.
3. Knowledge of "Grave Physical Harm"
Florida, 9 ° Massachusetts, 191 Minnesota,"9  Rhode Island, 93 and
Washington' 94 require that the individual actually witness the victim
in a dangerous situation, or be at the "scene of the emergency," to
trigger the duty. The three other states require only that the rescuer
185. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519.
186. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01.
187. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1.
188. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a).
189. Acts of God are distinguished from human acts, i.e., criminal acts. Acts of
God include "a raging river, a torrential downpour, a hurricane, tornado or earth-
quake ...." Biggs, supra note 1, at 244. One commentator has noted that while legal
scholars have historically hypothesized about the "no duty to rescue" rule involving
acts of God, "the criminal assault," like that of Kitty Genovese, is actually "[t]he
paradigm case of a duty to rescue." Heyman, supra note 1, at 679. Another scholar,
observing the same phenomenon, finds this remarkable because acts of God are the
"most worthy of Good Samaritan [legislation]." Biggs, supra note 1, at 244. He be-
lieves the statutes predominantly focus on duties to victims of criminal acts, however,
because of the common law desire to limit the coverage of the criminal law to "acts,"
rather than failures to act. Since one cannot control "Acts of God," perhaps society
should not be involved in forcing action in response to them. Since no human con-
duct started the process that created victims of "Acts of God" requiring a duty to aid
such victims should be beyond the reach of the criminal law. Id. at 245 (footnote
omitted).
190. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027(1)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (effective 1984)
(imposing duties to victims of sexual battery); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40 (Law
Co-op. 1992) (effective 1983) (imposing duties to victims of myriad crimes); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22(A) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1, 1974)
(imposing a duty to report on all those who know that a felony "has been or is being
committed"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100(1)(a)-(c) (West 1998) (1970) (impos-
ing duties to victims of a variety of crimes, but specifically mentioning victims of child
sexual and physical abuse); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998)
(effective Apr. 24, 1984) (imposing duties to victims of "a crime"). Rhode Island
separates, by provision, its duty to rescue statute from its duty to report statute.
Though its duty to rescue statute applies to victims of crimes and acts of God, see
supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text, its duty to report statute applies only to
victims of sexual assault. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-3.1 (1994) (effective 1983).
191. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027(1), (2).
192. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40.
193. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1) (Supp. 1999) (originally enacted as § 604.05
(1971); § 604.05(1) (effective Aug. 1, 1983)).
194. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (1994) (effective 1983).
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have knowledge of the victim's peril. 19 The difference between im-
posing a duty when one knows of a victim in danger versus a situation
where one actually witnesses that victim in danger can have a poten-
tially profound effect on the statute's reach. If a duty is imposed only
when a bystander witnesses the victim in danger, then the duty does
not apply when the bystander is merely told by another of the danger.
Conversely, if one has a duty as soon as she becomes aware of an
endangered victim, then there wil be a greater number of circum-
stances in which one must render aid.' 96
4. Statutes Imposing Duties to Rescue and to Report
Duties to rescue and to report differ in what they require of a res-
cuer. A duty to rescue requires actual intervention, while a duty to
report only requires the rescuer to notify the authorities. Although
Vermont,197 Minnesota,'198 Wisconsin,199 and Rhode Island 2 1 have
statutes imposing duties of actual rescue, only Vermont does not addi-
tionally require a duty to report.201 The other four states simply re-
quire a duty to report with no supplemental duty to rescue.202
Further, seven of the statutes impose criminal penalties for the breach
of the duty they impose.2 "3 Generally, the penalties for failing to com-
ply with a duty to report statute are greater than the penalties for
violating one's duty to rescue.204
195. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100(1).
196. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.22(A) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1998) (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (effective Mar. 22, 1968); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (effective Apr. 24, 1984).
197. The dearth of case law implicating these statutes provides that these conclu-
sions are nothing more than conjecture. A case implicating Ohio's statute, however,
is perhaps indicative of how other courts might consider the knowledge/witness ele-
ment of the statutes. See In re Stichtenoth, 425 N.E.2d 957 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
Although Ohio's statute requires only knowledge of a crime before one's duty to
report is triggered, the court held that as long as events led to the notification of the
authorities, the statute did not impose a duty to report on an individual. See id. at 958.
The holding, narrowing the statute's scope, perhaps reflects the court's recognition of
the inherent problems with an overly broad "knowledge" requirement.
198. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a).
199. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1) (Supp. 1999) (originally enacted as § 604.05
(1971); § 604.05(1) (effective Aug. 1, 1983)).
200. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(a).
201. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (1994) (effective 1984).
202. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519.
203. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (effective 1984); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40 (Law Co-op. 1992) (effective 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2921.22 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1998) (effective Jan. 1. 1974); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 9.69.100 (West 1998) (effective 1970).
204. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40; Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2921.22(A)(I); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100(4); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(a). Only Minnesota does
not impose a criminal penalty. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1). A violation of
Minnesota's statute, however, results in a fine of double the amount of that of Ver-
mont's. A petty misdemeanor under Minnesota law carries a fine of not more than
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C. Policies Behind the Statutes
Because the majority of states may have passed their good samari-
tan laws in response to bystander indifference to Kitty Genovese's
murder and to the well-publicized rape of a woman on a pool table in
a New Bedford, Massachusetts bar,2 °5 the policy behind these laws
was arguably to criminalize such apathy.0 6 A further policy consider-
ation, however, was the legislatures' belief in the symbolic power of
the law.207 When Vermont's good samaritan law was first enacted in
the late 1960s, it imposed a $100 criminal fine on an individual who
violated the statute.20  At least one scholar opined that the penalty
was relatively insignificant, due to Vermont's concern for its role as
the forerunner of this type of legislation.20 9 More than three decades
later, however, the penalty remains the same, even though seven other
states now have laws that impose similar duties. This fact may indi-
cate that the policy behind Vermont's statute included a belief that it
was useful for the law to make purely symbolic gestures. Other states
have acknowledged the largely symbolic components of their good sa-
maritan laws.210
D. Why the Eight Statutes Lie Dormant
In 1973, an article exploring the background and approach of the
country's first abrogation of the traditional "no duty to rescue" rule
concluded with the following observation:
$200. See id. § 609.02(4a). Moreover, Wisconsin's bill imposes a more severe criminal
penalty than the laws of either Vermont or Minnesota. An inactive bystander risks a
fine of up to $500 and a prison sentence of up to thirty days. See Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 939.51(3)(c) (defining the penalties imposed for a class (c) misdemeanor).
205. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.92.020 (defining the penalty for failure to
report as a gross misdemeanor, which includes a fine of up to $5000 and a prison
sentence of up to one year).
206. In 1983, patrons of Big Dan's bar in New Bedford, Massachusetts, observed
for over an hour as four men raped and assaulted a 21-year-old woman. See The
Tavern Rape: Cheers and No Help, Newsweek, Mar. 21, 1983, at 25, 25. Initial police
statements and news accounts reported that at least 15 witnesses not only failed to
intervene on the woman's behalf or call the police, but even cheered for her attackers.
See id. Though these accounts proved exaggerated, see Jonathan Friendly, The New
Bedford Rape Case: Confiision over Accounts of Cheering at Bar, N.Y. Times, Apr.
11, 1984, at A19, the public expressed outrage at news of the incident, and the legisla-
tures of Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island responded with good samaritan
legislation. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01; R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 11-37-3.1, 11-56-1.
207. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
208. But see Talk of the Nation, supra note 3 (interview with criminal defense attor-
ney Elizabeth Semil) ("[I]t's extremely important for the public to understand that
when laws like this are proposed, they are part of a political agenda for politicians
who are gearing and measuring their points in the poll [and] that they will do little to
aid ... public problem[s], if indeed [they exist].").
209. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(c).
210. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 55 n.30.
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On paper, at least, Vermont has made history, but the statute's prac-
tical effect remains to be seen. Within the state we do not know
whether any behavior has been altered-a carefully done study
would be enlightening.
Nor can we yet tell whether the Vermont statute will create en-
forcement or interpretive difficulties. In view of this lack of experi-
ence and information, other states may be reluctant to impose a
similar duty-or perhaps the lack of bad experience will hearten
those otherwise inclined to follow Vermont's lead.
2 11
Although these comments were made more than twenty-five years
ago, they continue to hold true today. To a substantial degree, there is
still a lack of experience and information regarding the enforcement
of good samaritan laws. In each state that imposes a duty to rescue or
to report, the statutes have produced virtually no case law."?-
Although no consensus exists as to why these laws lie dormant,
many posit that it is because the laws are virtually impossible to imple-
ment. For instance, the requirement that the rescue be "easy" argua-
bly curbs the statutes' reach, and may be irreconcilable with their
broader goals, because an "easy rescue" will almost always provide an
inactive bystander with the option of doing nothing.21 3 Criticism of
211. See Pardun, supra note 39, at 606. An original sponsor of Minnesota's bill
"indicate[d] that its purpose was largely symbolic, consonant with Minnesota's vision
of an ideal society." Id (quoting Representative Bill Luther). According to Wiscon-
sin prosecutors, their law has a symbolic component as well. See id. at 606-07. The
citizens of Wisconsin, one prosecutor concluded, "would report [a serious] crime with-
out [a law] on the books." Yeager, supra note 45, at 16 n.70 (quoting letter from James
C. Babler, District Attorney, Barron County, WIs., to Yeager (Nov. 11, 1991) (on file
with Yeager) (alterations in original)). A representative of Wisconsin's Attorney
General's office insisted that although "it might be a little rosy-eyed to say this, I
think the good people of Wisconsin generally aid victims when they see them in
trouble." Dave Daley, Few Prosecuted Under State "Samaritan" Like France, Wiscon-
sin Requires Residents to Help Crime, Accident Victims, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Sept.
5, 1997, at 9A (quoting James Haney, director of research and information for Wis-
consin Attorney General Jim Doyle).
212. Franklin, supra note 85, at 61.
213. In the last 30 years, Vermont's courts have had only one opportunity to con-
sider the civil liability the statute might impose, see Sabia v. State, 669 A.2d 1187, 1194
(Vt. 1995) (holding that if individuals are expected to provide -reasonable assistance"
under this section, civil liability may be imposed if their acts are grossly negligent or if
they expect to be compensated for their services), and one opportunity to confront
the criminal liability it does impose. See State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (Vt. 1981)
(holding that Vermont's Duty to Aid the Endangered Act does not impose a duty to
intervene in a fight). According to a spokeswoman for Vermont's attorney general,
"no one has ever been cited under [Vermont's] law." Chapman, supra note 23. Simi-
larly, according to an assistant attorney general in Minnesota, that state's good samar-
itan law "has never been used." Id.; see also Yeager, supra note 45, at 25 (noting the
lack of "appellate decisions upholding the conviction of a defendant prosecuted under
a contemporary easy-rescue statute"). This similar virtual lack of case law in Minne-
sota makes some question the utility of its law. See Pardun, supra note 39, at 597.
Moreover, in Wisconsin as well, since the statute's passage more than 15 years ago,
Wisconsin's prosecutors have used the state's good samaritan statute only once to
convict an inactive bystander. See State v. La Plante, 521 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Wis. Ct.
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good samaritan legislation focuses on this issue of what exactly consti-
tutes danger or peril to oneself,214 creating a difficult as opposed to an
easy rescue, and thus relieving rescuers of their duties.
In its one opportunity to consider the utility of the state's good sa-
maritan law, Vermont's Supreme Court's decision indicated that that
the "easy rescue" requirement prevented the law's implementation.2 5
Ironically, in this criminal case, it was the defendant who used Ver-
mont's good samaritan law as an affirmative defense to charges that
he assaulted and battered his son.2 16 Because bystanders observed the
assault but did not intervene, the defendant argued that their inaction
represented "tacit" approval of his conduct. 17 If his son had been
"exposed to grave physical harm," the defendant contended, then
those who observed the beating would have had a duty to inter-
vene.218 Their inaction, he argued, should indicate to the jury that he
was not "trying to seriously injure his son. '2 19 Unpersuaded by this
argument, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that intervening in
this fight produced too great a risk of danger or peril to the potential
App. 1994) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the bystander's conviction). The
good samaritan laws of Rhode Island, Florida, Washington, and Massachusetts lie
equally as dormant as the statutes of the three states mentioned above. Because
Ohio's statute imposes a duty to report all felonies, it has a broader reach than the
statutes of the other seven states and has produced more case law. See, e.g., State v.
Miccichi, No. 86AP08066, 1987 WL 14481, at *2 (Ohio. Ct. App. July 20, 1987) (hold-
ing that a dentist's unreasonable delay in reporting the theft of drugs from his office
constituted a violation of Ohio's duty to report statute); State v. Wardlow, 484 N.E.2d
276, 279 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a reporting statute gives a person fair
notice that failing to report a serious crime which the person has knowledge about is
forbidden); In re Stichtenoth, 425 N.E.2d 957, 958 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
the statute does not require an individual to report if events have occurred that result
in notification). But as the cases cited above indicate, Ohio's statute has not been
applied to situations involving the good samaritan scenario whereby a stranger comes
to the aid of another by making a phone call to the police or attempting an "easy
rescue."
214. One commentator concludes that "even in the most wide ranging statutes cov-
ering the duty to aid, the language and the limitations written into the statutes allow
for all but the easiest rescues to be aborted by the would-be Samaritan." Biggs, supra
note 1, at 246. Another scholar, while acknowledging the difficulties a prosecutor
would have in proving a bystander had knowledge that another person was in danger,
that the danger was serious, etc., argues that the difficulty of proving these facts
"poses no problems with which the criminal law is unfamiliar; questionable proof of
'knowledge' is routinely presented in criminal trials, and 'serious danger' commonly
arises when a defendant claims to have justifiably harmed or killed another." Yeager,
supra note 45, at 23 n.111; see also Silver, supra note 55, at 433 (arguing that although
it is difficult to establish that a bystander "knew of injury or peril," establishing such
knowledge is merely the problem of proving what was on a defendant's mind, a prob-
lem which "exists in nearly every criminal prosecution").
215. See, e.g., Yeager, supra note 45, at 25 (asking the question of what exactly is an
"easy rescue").
216. See Joyce, 433 A.2d at 273.
217. See id. at 272-73.
218. See id. at 273.
219. Id. (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (effective Mar. 22, 1968)).
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rescuers.' The statute imposes a duty only in cases of "easy rescue,"
and this case did not qualify as one.22' The bystanders, therefore,
breached no duty and the defendant's affirmative defense failed2
Even a duty to report would cause prosecutors problems with en-
forcement in the context of a Genovese-type situation23 Prosecutors
would need to determine which onlookers actually heard the victim's
screams, whether those onlookers who heard the screams knew that
the person screaming needed their assistance, whether assistance had
already been provided, and whether the onlookers' inaction was "a
conscious decision not to render aid," as opposed to inaction "based
on ... a desire for self-preservation" or an inability to determine the
source of the screaming.'
Additionally, in instances where bystanders fail to satisfy their stat-
utory duty to act, the fact that the prosecutor's "first priority would
always be to obtain convictions against the violent offenders" them-
selves presents further obstacles for good samaritan laws.' Because
these "bystanders would be critical witnesses"' 6 against these offend-
ers, "[t]he availability of 'objective' witnesses may be foreclosed if
they are threatened with a criminal prosecution of their own."' 7
Cases of group rescue are unusually complicated and costly, be-
cause they involve a determination of which individual actually owed
what duty.' For instance, under Minnesota's statute, it is unclear
whether the law imposes a duty even when others have already ren-
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. Notably, if Kitty Genovese's murder had taken place in a state with a
good samaritan law imposing a duty to rescue (as contrasted with a duty to report),
the danger to a rescuer coming to her aid would have been far too great to warrant
the imposition of any statutory duty as well. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a)
(1973) (requiring that a person render aid only "to the extent that [it] can be rendered
without danger or peril to himself").
224. Although one commentator's research revealed virtually no charges brought
by prosecutors under the duty to rescue laws of Vermont, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Rhode Island, it did confirm that prosecutors employed the duty to report statutes of
Rhode Island, Washington, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Florida. See, e.g., Yeager, supra
note 45, at 32 & n.153 (discussing an instance of use of the Ohio statute). Prosecutors
admitted, however, that the employment was limited. See id. at 35. A combination of
few incidents and an inability to identify the perpetrating offenders contributed to this
limitation. See id.; see also Wenik, supra note 53, at 1803 (arguing that the reporting
statutes of Ohio, Washington, and Massachusetts are "plagued with serious defects as
presently drafted" and observing that the Ohio statute's failure to adequately define
"knowledge" may result in an individual reporting a rumor). The number of convic-
tions under these reporting statutes remains negligible.
225. Biggs, supra note 1, at 236.
226. Yeager, supra note 45, at 35 n.162 (quoting a letter from Kitty-Ann van Door-
ninck, Admin. Deputy Office of Prosecuting Attorney, Pierce County Wash., to Ye-
ager (Apr. 3, 1992) (on file with Yeager)).
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting a letter from Gilbert J. Nadeau, Jr., First Assistant District Attor-
ney for Bristol District, Mass., to Yeager (Nov. 13, 1991) (on file with Yeager)).
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dered aid to the victim. In a group rescue situation similar to the New
Bedford case,229 whether a phone call to the police by one patron in
the bar would have suspended everyone else's duty to rescue is uncer-
tain. If Minnesota's statute, like Vermont's, would indeed suspend the
duty if another had already rendered aid, then what would happen if
the aid rendered by another was not "reasonable? '230 A bystander at
Big Dan's, relying on another patron's rescue attempt, might risk lia-
bility if that attempt was later considered to be less than reasonable.
Yet another explanation for the continued inactivity under the eight
good samaritan laws is that the special relationship exceptions to the
traditional "no duty to rescue" rule may render these laws superflu-
ous. In 1994, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the first convic-
tion of an inactive bystander under the state's eleven-year-old good
samaritan law.23' In January 1992, Karie LaPlante hosted a party at
her home. 2 During the course of the evening, one of her guests told
LaPlante that she planned to physically assault another guest at the
party. 3 When a fight finally broke out, seven of the party guests
brutally beat the victim while LaPlante and others watched.2 34 The
State charged and obtained a conviction against the defendant-party
host for failing to aid the victim and for failing to call others who
might have rendered aid.235 LaPlante challenged the constitutionality
of the statute and its application to her case.236 The court rejected
LaPlante's contention, observing that "[a] plain and reasonable read-
ing of the statute reveals that any person who knows that a crime is
being committed and knows that the victim is exposed to bodily harm
229. See Landes & Posner, supra note 67, at 96-97; Yeager, supra note 45, at 23
n.111; Pardun, supra note 39, at 605 ("The capital needed to investigate, arrest, and
adjudicate violators of these laws could reach exorbitant amounts.... [T]he resources
saved by not enacting Good Samaritan laws would result in the prosecution of offend-
ers of more serious crimes instead of violators of a general duty to assist."). Some
argue, however, that because incidents like Kitty Genovese's murder, which could
have potentially produced 38 defendants, are "quite unusual," focusing on the
problems of litigating mass-bystander situations is unnecessary. Silver, supra note 55,
at 432 n.59. To conclude that the incidents are "quite unusual," however, begs the
question of why good samaritan legislation is necessary in the first place.
230. See supra note 206.
231. See Silver, supra note 55, at 432-33 & n.61. Minnesota, Rhode Island, and
Vermont all require "reasonable assistance." See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01(1)
(Supp. 1999) (originally enacted as § 604.05 (1971); § 604.05(1) effective Aug. 1, 1983);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (1994) (effective 1984); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973)
(effective Mar. 22, 1968).
232. See State v. La Plante, 521 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Wis. 1994). Notably, La Plante is
also the state's most recent conviction under the statute.
233. See id. at 449.
234. See id.
235. See id. "[S]everal individuals who were at defendant's party witnessed defend-
ant standing idly by while victim was brutally beaten." Id. at 448. The fact that
LaPlante was not alone when she observed the fight is telling, for prosecutors charged
only LaPlante with a crime. See id. at 449.
236. See id.
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must either call for a law enforcement officer, call for other assistance
or provide assistance to the victim.
' '2 7
Although the Wisconsin court convicted LaPlante under its good
samaritan law, the conviction was not necessarily based on the court's
belief that citizens should all behave as good samaritans or risk prose-
cution. Instead, the conviction may have rested on the court's sense
that a party host who creates a risk to her guests owes those guests a
duty. In other words, the nature of the special relationship (as recog-
nized by tort law) between the rescuer (LaPlante) and the victim (her
guest) may have warranted the imposition of a duty." s If this sense
was not the basis for the conviction, then presumably the prosecutors
would have charged, and the court would have convicted, all of the
people who observed the fight with a violation of Wisconsin's duty to
aid act," 9 rather than only the host.
Whether the lawmakers that enacted the eight good samaritan stat-
utes in their states were motivated by symbolism240 or by a genuine
belief that they could actually affect their citizens' behavior,24 it can-
not be denied that the laws have failed. Commentators often ask why
bystanders fail to intervene when they observe another human being
in trouble.24 2 Some argue that fear paralyzes them.243 Others contend
237. See id.
238. Id. at 451.
239. For a discussion of tort law's special relationship exceptions, see supra Part
II.A.1. Two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts may have influenced the
court's determination that LaPlante owed a duty to her guest: § 315, which imposes a
duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical
harm to another person if a special relationship exists between the actor and the third
person; and § 321, which imposes a duty on one who creates an unreasonable risk of
causing physical harm to another. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315, 321
(1965).
Similarly, in Tiedeman v. Morgan, 435 N.W.2d 86, 88 (Minn. 1989), the court relied
on a special relationship exception to the "no duty to rescue" rule, rather than impli-
cating the state's good samaritan law. The defendants in Tiedeman argued that the
immunity provision of Minnesota's good samaritan law applied to them in a situation
where they negligently failed to rescue a guest in their home. See id. at 88-89. The
court held that the statute was inapplicable to the defendants' case, however, because
a special relationship exception, not Minnesota's good samaritan law, imposed a duty
on the hosts to their guest. See iL at 88. The court recognized:
the existence of a common law duty of care for those who know or should
know of the needs of one in circumstances under their control ........
Based on both the meaning and the purpose of the Good Samaritan statute,
we conclude it does not apply to the pre-existing duty of care asserted here.
Id
Like La Plante, Tiedeman may suggest that in the rare case implicating a good
samaritan law, a court may rely on the special relationship exceptions as a basis for its
ruling.
240. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
242. See Franklin, supra note 85, at 58 ("iT]he legal requirement of rescue would,
in moments of hesitation, tip the balance toward the desired action. Some rescuers
might be moved initially by awareness of such a law."). A study indicates that if
people know a legal duty to aid another exists, they judge more harshly the failure to
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that bystanders free-ride on each other, each one assuming that the
other will render the aid.2 " Notwithstanding the various explana-
tions, people simply do not want to "get[ ] directly involved. 2 45
While good samaritan laws may purport to save lives and prevent inju-
ries,24 6 there is no evidence that they actually do so, nor that the "no
duty to rescue" rule hinders the good these laws might accomplish.
Therefore, as discussed below in part IV, if Congress passes the Sher-
rice Iverson Act, it will almost certainly prove to be as futile as previ-
ous attempts have been to legislate duties to report and rescue.
IV. THE SHERRICE IVERSON ACT: A FUTILE RESPONSE TO
BYSTANDER INDIFFERENCE
This part examines three reasons why the Sherrice Iverson Act is
destined to fail: the law would be strikingly similar to the eight good
samaritan statutes examined above, it would not have succeeded in
saving Sherrice Iverson's life, and the mandatory child abuse report-
ing statutes of all fifty states negate the need for such a bill.
A. Comparison to Dormant Good Samaritan Laws
The uselessness of the Sherrice Iverson Act can best be demon-
strated by comparison to the latent good samaritan statutes previously
examined. 47 Senator Boxer and Congressman Lampson's proposed
CAPTA amendment would require that any state accepting funding
for child abuse prevention must provide
an assurance in the form of a certification by the chief executive
officer of the State that the State has in effect and is enforcing a
State law providing for a criminal penalty on an individual 18 years
of age or older who fails to report to a State or local law enforce-
ment official that the individual has witnessed another individual in
the State engaging in sexual abuse of a child. 248
In her 1998 introduction to the Senate of the Sherrice Iverson Act,
Boxer explained that "[t]he details of these laws, including the penal-
ties imposed, are left to the states. The bill only requires people to
report the crimes they witness; it does not require them to intervene in
act. See id. at 58-59. If told that a duty does not exist, people regard the failure as
nothing more than distasteful. See id. at 59.
243. See Yeager, supra note 45, at 15-20.
244. See id. at 15-16.
245. See Biggs, supra note 1, at 234-35; Wenik, supra note 53, at 1788-89.
246. Bibb Latan6 & John M. Darley, Social Determinants of Bystander Intervention
in Emergencies, in Altruism and Helping Behavior: Social Psychological Studies of
Some Antecedents and Consequences 13, 14 (Jacqueline R. Macaulay & Leonard
Berkowitz eds., 1970) (exploring the psychology behind those that do not get involved
and concluding that "apathy," "indifference," and "unconcern" do not accurately de-
scribe their behavior).
247. See Silver, supra note 55, at 428.
248. See supra Part III.
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potentially dangerous situations."' 49 The Sherrice Iverson Act would
be, therefore, almost identical to the dormant good samaritan report-
ing statutes of Rhode Island and Washington, 0 and closely resemble
the good samaritan statutes of Florida and Massachusetts, states with
laws that impose duties to report sexual offenses. 5 1
The policies behind Boxer and Lampson's Act are also strikingly
similar to those of the eight state good samaritan laws. Boxer and
Lampson introduced the Sherrice Iverson Act in response to the pub-
lic outrage at David Cash, Jr.'s "deadly inaction."'  Lampson argued
that the Sherrice Iverson "case clearly indicates that there is a need to
pass this law." 3 Because crimes against children, according to Lamp-
son, are "on the rise, this type of legislation is more important than
ever before." 54 Further, in response to an assertion that he was at-
tempting to legislate morality, Lampson acknowledged the inherent
problems in a law that allows government to mandate that people
make "correct choices," 5 but suggested that it was the responsibility
of the government to step in when people refuse to do the right
thing. 5 6
As the analysis of the good samaritan laws enacted in eight states
demonstrated, however, there are many reasons as to why passing
such legislation at the federal level is not the proper response to Sher-
rice Iverson's death. The justifications offered by Boxer and Lampson
in support of the Sherrice Iverson Act are eerily similar to those of-
fered by advocates of the good samaritan statutes that were passed
over twenty-five years ago and have proven to be utterly useless.
249. S. 793, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); S. 2452, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998). Currently, all
50 states have laws requiring certain individuals to report child abuse. See Trost, supra
note 18, at 194. The child abuse reporting law that would be imposed on the states by
the Sherrice Iverson amendment differs from the reporting laws presently imposed
because the federal amendment would require all individuals over eighteen to report.
Most reporting statutes require only certain professionals to report such as: physi-
cians, teachers, child-care workers, social workers, psychologists, etc. The Sherrice
Iverson Act also would differ from current reporting laws because it would impose a
mandatory criminal penalty, and it addresses child sexual abuse specifically.
250. See S. 2452 (statement of Senator Boxer). Boxer misstated the number of
states with such laws. See id. ("Only two states, Vermont and Minnesota, currently
have such 'good samaritan' laws."). There are actually eight states with such laws:
Vermont, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Florida,
and Ohio. For a discussion of these states' statutes, see supra Part III.
251. The Sherrice Iverson Act would be particularly similar to Washington's report-
ing statute. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.69.100 (\Vest 1998) (1970).
252. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.027 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (effective 1984); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 268, § 40 (Law Co-op. 1992) (effective 1983).
253. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
254. New Bill Requires Reporting of Ser Crimes, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Sept. 10, 1998,
at 4A.
255. Id
256. Talk of the Nation, supra note 3.
257. See id- ("[I]f we can't grow up in our own lives, having the sense of right and
wrong... then I believe that we have to have government respond to it.").
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Rather than repeating mistakes of the past simply out of some sense
of justice, Congress should heed the lessons that these state statutes
have taught and refuse to implement the Act into law.
B. The Sherrice Iverson Act Would Not Have Saved
Sherrice Iverson
Not only would the Sherrice Iverson Act, if ultimately passed, likely
lie as dormant as the eight good samaritan laws have, it would have
failed to save the victim that inspired its passage. The Sherrice Iver-
son Act imposes a duty only on those who "witness" child sexual
abuse. 8 But it is unclear as to how much of Strohmeyer's assault of
Sherrice Iverson that Cash actually witnessed.2 9 Therefore, if Ne-
vada's legislature had already implemented a law like the Sherrice
Iverson Act When Sherrice was murdered, prosecutors still might have
struggled in trying to convict Cash of a crime. Presumably, Boxer and
Lampson drafted the Act to create a narrowly tailored law that did
not encroach too severely on an individual rescuer's personal free-
dom. The difficulty with doing so, however, is that the law as drafted
may not have reached even the behavior from which it was inspired.260
The fact that the Sherrice Iverson Act would not have saved the
seven-year-old girl in Nevada is not surprising. This is because "[e]ye
witnesses to sexual batteries are rare."'2 ' 1 Further, if one does, in fact,
witness a sexual battery, that person is usually prosecuted as a "code-
fendant or accessory."2 62 Therefore, the likelihood that the proposed
Sherrice Iverson Act will actually help curb child sexual abuse
through a requirement that the abuse be witnessed is quite slim.
C. Mandatory Child Abuse Statutes Negate the Need for the
Sherrice Iverson Act
Finally, the child abuse reporting statutes of the fifty states provide
abused children with a certain degree of protection that would obviate
the need for a good samaritan law aimed at the prevention of child
sexual abuse.263 Evidence exists that these statutes, though imper-
258. See supra Part III.
259. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
262. Yeager, supra note 45, at 35 n.162 (quoting letter from C. Marie King, Assis-
tant State Attorney, 6th Jud. Cir., Fla., to Yeager (Nov. 25, 1991) (on file with Ye-
ager)); Telephone Interview with Lawrence Bushing, Deputy Bureau Chief of the
Family Violence and Child Abuse Bureau of the New York County District Attor-
ney's Office, (Apr. 23, 1999) (concluding that witnesses to child sexual abuse are
"rare, but not unprecedented"). Because child sexual abuse occurs most frequently in
the home, such abuse is only "occasionally" witnessed. See id.
263. See Yeager, supra note 45, at 37 (quoting letter from C.W. Goodwin, Chief
Assistant State Attorney, 2nd Jud. Cir., Fla., to Yeager (Nov. 25, 1991) (on file with
Yeager)).
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fect,264 already help to curb child abuse.265 On the other hand, there
is little evidence that good samaritan laws deter people from commit-
ting crimes, aid in aborting crimes in the process of being committed,
or save victims from potential acts of violence.'
Implementation of the Sherrice Iverson Act would also create in-
creased confusion and difficulty in an already ambiguous field.
Although child sexual abuse "provokes society's strongest reac-
tion,' ' 267 defining the conduct remains as elusive as defining any other
kind of abuse.' s Therefore, without a clear definition of child sexual
abuse, recognizing that one has witnessed this kind of abuse is poten-
tially as difficult as concluding that one's suspicion merits reporting
2 69
Further, commentators argue that statutes requiring everyone to re-
port abuse produce a "flood of unreliable reports.""7 0 Reports from
professionals, to whom the state mandatory child abuse reporting stat-
utes primarily address, are more likely to be substantiated than those
from ordinary citizens.2 7' Untrained individuals, with potentially no
knowledge about children, may encounter insurmountable difficulties
when forced to determine whether to report what they have
witnessed.
264. For a discussion of these reporting statutes, see supra Part II.A.2.b.
265. For a discussion of the problems inherent in the mandatory child abuse report-
ing statutes, see part II.C.
266. See Rosencrantz, supra note 102, at 341-42 (concluding that the increased
number of abused children brought to the attention of public authorities over a
twenty-nine-year period indicates the success of reporting statutes).
267. See supra Part III.D. In some circumstances, therefore, the statutes might pro-
vide even greater protection to children than the Sherrice Iverson Act would provide.
For instance, these laws ostensibly require strangers to the child to report not only
what they witnessed, but that to which they merely had knowledge. See, eg., Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 415.504 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999) (requiring that a reporter have knowledge
of or reasonable cause to suspect the abuse); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.556 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1999) (requiring reporter have knowledge of or reason to believe abuse exists).
268. Meriwether, supra note 95, at 159.
269. See id. at 154-60.
270. In questioning the constitutionality of the state's mandatory reporting statute,
Nevada's Supreme Court emphasized the importance of clear statutory definitions:
"Because a criminal penalty may be imposed on persons who fail to comply with the
reporting requirements of [this section], the terms of that statute must be clear
enough to inform those who are subject to the reporting provisions what conduct will
render them liable to a criminal sanction." Washoe County v. Sferrazza, 766 P.2d 896,
897 (Nev. 1988). The court concluded that the statute's requirement that an individ-
ual report suspected abuse "immediately"
vests in the prosecuting authorities unbridled discretion to determine
whether a report of suspected child abuse was made quickly enough to sat-
isfy the mandate of [this section. Therefore] a professional who ... sus-
pect[s] a child is being abused ... report[s] his suspicions only at great risk to
himself of prosecution for failing to make an "immediate" report. [This sec-
tion] fails to inform [mandated reporters] what conduct will render them
liable for criminal sanctions.
Id.271. Vieth, supra note 95, at 156.
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CONCLUSION
The introduction of a federal good samaritan law to Congress in the
aftermath of Sherrice Iverson's death and Strohmeyer's trial was un-
doubtedly done with the best intentions. Barbara Boxer and Nicholas
Lampson's attempt to make a statement to the country that behavior
like David Cash, Jr.'s will not be tolerated is laudable. But history has
unequivocally proven that these laws do not actually affect a by-
stander's behavior or make it easier for prosecutors to charge that
bystander with a crime. In light of the dormancy of current good sa-
maritan legislation and the availability of child abuse reporting stat-
utes, the Sherrice Iverson Act will have no impact on the tragedies it
attempts to address and should not be signed into law.
